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ADMIRALTY-JURISDICTION-WEST V. MARTIN, 92 PAC. (WASH.) 334-
Held, that admiralty has jurisdiction of the injury where a pier of a law-
fully constructed bridge resting in the bottom of a navigable river is run
into by a vessel. Fullerton, J., dissenting.
Beginning in I865, the Supreme Court held that jurisdiction of admiralty
was exclusively dependent upon locality of the act, The Plymouth, 3 Wallace
2o, and that the place or locality of the thing injured, and not of the agent
causing the injury, was the real test, Ex parte Phenix Ins. Co., 118 U. S.
61o, also that a cause of action not being completely on water, when the thing
injured was on land, Johnson v. Chicago Elevator Co., 119 U. S. 388, that
injuries to bridges, which are mere prolongations over waters of highways
upon land, City of Milwaukee v. The Curtis, 37 Fed. Rep. 705, were not
within the jurisdiction of admiralty courts, The John C. Sweeney, 55 Fed.
Rep. 54o; but starting with an obiter dictum in The Arkansas, 17 Fed. Rep.
383, which stated that in such cases there should be a right in admiralty
because of the inherent nature of the resulting lien. The Supreme Court
finally decided in The Blackheath, i95 U. S. 361, that such cases were cog-
nizable in admiralty, thus practically overruling the old test of locality as
laid down in The Plymouth, supra, and extending jurisdiction to any claim
for damages caused by any ship. Some Federal Courts, however, refuse
to interpret the above decision as overruling The Plymouth, supra; The Cur-
tis, 152 Fed. 588. But the majority follow it as the best rule of law.
Bowers Hydraulic Dredging Co. v. Federal Contracting Co., 148 Fed. 29o.
BAsTARDY-EviDENcE-ADMisSlBILITY.-LAND V. STATE, 105 S. W. (ARx.)
go.-Held, that in bastardy it is not error to allow the child to be exhibited
to the jury, the relative improbability of a child having any perceptible
resemblance to its parent going to the weight of the evidence only.
Exhibition of the child to allow jury to observe whether it bears any
resemblance to the putative father is allowed in some cases on its being, in
some respects, the subject-matter of the controversy, Gilmanton v. Hant, 38
N. H. io8, or that it is pertinent evidence, Higley v. Bostick, 63 AtL (Conn.)
Rep. 786, or on common sense and observation, State v. Woodruff, 67 N. C.
89; Gaunt v. State, 5o N. J. L. 49o, or on the physiological fact that feat-
ures and personal traits are often transmitted from parent to child, Finne-
gan v. Dugan, 96 Mass. 197, to uphold which theory Lord Mansfield, in the
notorious Douglas Case, is reported as saying: "That he considered likeness
as an argument of a child's being the son of a parent;" cited on authority
of Hanawalt v. State, 64 Wis. 84, and which follows irrespective of age of
child, Scott v. Donovan, 153 Mass. 378, to which, however, there is a con-
trary view, State v. Danforth, 48 Iowa 43. The conflicting cases base their
arguments on the fact that such resemblance being purely notional or imag-
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inary, Clark v. Bradstreet, 80 Me. 454, is too vague, uncertain and fanciful,
Rick v. State, 19 Ind. 152, and would establish a dangerous rule of evidence.
People v. Carney, 29 Hun. (N. Y.) 47.
BILLS AND NOTES-INTEREST COMPUTATION-COMPOUND INTEREST.-
ADAMS V. ILL. LIFE INS. Co., 104 S. W. (Ky.) 718.-Held, under a note pro-
viding for interest at a certain rate per annum, payable semi-annually, until
maturity, and thereafter interest at that rate per annum only, the holders
were entitled after maturity only to current interest, and not to interest on
interest.
General rule is that simple interest only can be recovered, Force v. City
of Elizabeth, 28 N. J. Eg. 403; Townsend v. Riley, 46 N. H. 313, for law
does not sanction any implication that interest becomes principal, Van Husan
v. Kanouse, 13 Mich. 303, so as to carry interest, Dean v. Williams, 17 Mass.
417; nor is interest ever a legal incident to non-payment of interest, Stokely
v. Thompson, 34 Pa. St. 21o, although some courts allow it where payment
of interest is unjustly neglected or refused. Aurora City v. West, 7 Wal-
lace (U. S.) 82. Still interest can bear interest, Auketel v. Converse, 17
Ohio St. ii, when such an agreement has been made with the other party
to that effect, either by statute or common law, Stower v. Evans, 38 Mo. 461,
but to be valid must be made after interest has become due, Young v. Hill,
67 N. Y. 162, for an original agreement at time of loan allowing interest
on interest is unjust, oppressive, harsh and ruinous to debtor, but is not
usurious, Camp v. Bates, ii Conn. 488.
BILLS AND NOTES-LIABILITY OF INDORSER OF NON-NEGOTIABLE NOTE.-
BANK OF LUVERNE V. SHARPE, 44 SO. 871 (ALA.).-Held, that the indorser
of a non-negotiable note is liable to the indorsee to the same extent as the
indorser of a negotiable note.
The general rule is that the indorsement of a non-negotiable note oper-
ates only as an assignment and carries no guaranty, Story v. Lamb, 52 Mich.
525; Shaffstall v. McDaniell, 152 Pa. St. 598; Kendall v. Parker, lO3 Cal.
319; unless the indorser shows an intention to guarantee the payment of the
instrument, First Nat'l Bank v. Falkenham, 94 Cal. 141; for instance, by
inserting the words, "with recourse," Klein v. Keiser, 87 Pa. St. 485; or if he
make an express agreement to that effect. Shaffstall v. McDaniell, supra.
In other states, the liability of an assignor is analogous to that of an irreg-
ular indorser of a negotiable instrument. Prentiss v. Danielson, 5 Conn.
175; Sweetser v. French, 13 Met. (Mass.) 262. Under the N. Y. doc-
trine it is a positive undertaking and indorser is not entitled to demand and
notice of non-payment. Cromwell v. Hewitt, 40 N. Y. 491. In Ohio, it is a
collateral undertaking between indorser and indorsee and demand and notice
is necessary as upon negotiable paper. Parker v. Riddle, ii Ohio 103. Stat-
utes govern in other states. Nat'l Bank v. Leonard, 91 Ga. 8o5; Sainstag et
al. v. Conley et al., 64 Mo. 476.
CRIMINAL LAw-FORMER JEOPARDY-NEw TRIAL.-HUNTINGTON V. SUP.
CT. OF CITY AND Co. OF SAN FRANCISCO, 90 PAC. 141 (CAL.).-Held, that
where an information charged the accused with the crime of murder and he
was convicted of manslaughter and on appeal a new trial was ordered, on
the second trial he could only be tried upon the charge of manslaughter,
since he had been acquitted of the charge of murder.
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In a majority of the states of this country it is held that, when on an
indictment for murder, the accused is found guilty of a lesser offense, it is
virtually an acquittal of the higher offense. Hunt v. State, 25 Miss. 358;
Smith v. State, 22 Texas App. 316. And the only effect of setting aside the
verdict and granting a new trial is to leave undetermined the question
whether the accused committed the lesser offense. State v. Belden, 33 Wis.
121; Johnson v. State, 27 Fla. 245. But there are a number of states in
which it is held that the principle that no man can be twice put in jeopardy
for the same offense means "without his consent," and he may avail himself
of the privilege, or not, as he pleases. State v. Bradley, 67 Vt. 465. And
the effect of setting aside a verdict, finding the defendant guilty of man-
slaughter, is to leave at issue and undetermined the fact of the homicide,
also the fact whether the defendant committed it if one was committed.
State v. Behrmer, 20 Ohio St. 572; State v. Gillis, 73 S. C. 318. The accused
is tried on the original indictment, and the trial proceeds as if no other trial
had ever been held. State v. Morrison, 67 Kan. 144; Waller v. State, io4
Ga. 505.
DAMAGEs-GROUNDS-MVIENTAL SUFFERING.-ST. Louis, I. M. & S. RY.
Co. v. TAYLOR, io4 S. W. (ARK.) 55I.-Held, that under the rule that mental
suffering alone, without physical injury or other elements of damage, cannot
be made the subject of an independent action for damage, even where the
act or violation of duty complained of was wilfully committed, a railroad is
not liable for damages to a passenger for mental suffering caused by mere
verbal abuse of the station agent. Wood and Riddick, J.J., dissenting.
General rule is that mental suffering alone gives no right of action,
Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cases 577; Joch v. Dankwordt, 85 Ill. 331. The
cases allowing recovery for it can be grouped into three classes. First,
when it is intimately connected with personal injury, Robertson v. Cornelson,
34 Fed. Rep. 716; McMahon v. The Northern C. R. R. Co., 39 Md. 438, or
when it is natural or proximate consequence of some recognized cause of
action, Gilvey v. Lewis, 68 Conn. 392; or actionable injury, Stone v. Hey-
wood, 7 Allen (Mass.) ii8. Second, breach of contract for marriage and in
seduction cases, Southerland Damages, 732; Lunt v. Philbrick, 59 N. H. 59.
Third, when a wilful wrong has been committed, William v. Underhill, 71
N. Y. Supp. 291; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Henderson, 89 Ala. 5io, although on this
point the authorities are not harmonious. This latter doctrine in some
cases is extended to allow recovery for any injury connected with insult or
malice, Schmitz v. The St. L. L M. & S. Ry. Co., II9 Mo. 256, or grief,
etc., Wadsworth v. M. N. Tel. Co., 86 Tenn. 695, and this without proof of
any pecuniary loss, Reise v. M. N. Tel. Co., 123 Ind. 294, since, the courts
say, mind is no less a part of the person than the body, and sufferings of
former are sometimes more acute than latter, Young v. Telegraph Co., io7
N. C. 370, and even going so far as to say that wounding a man's feelings
is as much actual damage as breaking his limbs, Herd v. The Georgia R. Co.,
79 Ga. 358.
DEAD BODIES-PowER TO ORDER EXHUMATION-RIGHTS OF WIDOW.-
MUTUAL LIFE INS. Co. OF N. Y. v. GRIESA, ET AL., I56 FED. 398.-Held, that
a court of law has no power to order the exhumation of a dead body in an
action at law to which the widow of the deceased, who has the right to
control the body, is not a party.
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A dead body is not property in the strict sense of the common law, but
it is a quasi property, and those having it in charge hold it'as a trust which
a Court of Equity will regulate, Cunningham v. Reardon, 98 Mass. 538, but
there is not any universal rule as to the burial of the dead applicable alike
to all cases, and each case must be considered in equity upon its own merits,
though the paramount right is in the surviving husband or wife. Pettigrew
v. Pettigrew, 207 Pa. St. 313. The majority of cases show that the surviv-
ing husband *or wife has the superior right to the body before or after
burial, as in the case of Durell v. Hayward, 9 Gray. 248, where the relatives
of the deceased placed a tombstone over the grave, without the consent of
the surviving husband, and it was held that he could remove it, though this
right is subject to statutory provisions in some states, as in the case of
Young v. The School of Physicians and Surgeons, 81 Md. 358, where, under
a local law of Baltimore City, the coroner had power to hold inquests and
to order autopsies, and he ordered the autopsy and mutilated the body with-
out the consent of the widow, he was held not liable for the same.
DEEs-PP~suMPTION AS TO DELIVERY.-CRABTREE v. CRABTREE, 113 N. W.
(IowA) 123.-Held, where a deed bears one date and the certificate of
acknowledgment a later date, the date of the certificate is presumed to be
the time of delivery.
Generally, the date of" the deed is presumptively the date of delivery.
Wickham v. Morehouse, 16 Fed. 324; Smith v. Porter, Io Gray. 66. The
burden of proof is on the party alleging the contrary. Williams v. Arm-
strong, 13o Ala. 389. Possession of deed by grantor subsequent to date of
deed refutes presuimption. Harris v. Norton, 16 Barb. 264. By weight of
authority this presumption is not overcome by the fact that the certificate
of acknowledgment bears a later date. Biglow v. Biglow, 56 N. Y. Supp.
794; Hardin v. Crote, 78 Ill. 533. Some courts, nevertheless, hold that date
of acknowledgment is presumptively the date of delivery. Atlantic City v.
New Auditorium Pier Co., 63 N. J. Eq. 644. But in some jurisdictions this
is because acknowledgment is necessary to a valid execution of the deed.
-Bailey v. Selden, 124 Ala. 4o3.
DIVORCE-DECREE-SETTING AsLF-WooD v. WOOD, 113 N. W. (IowA)
492.-Held, that a decree in a divorce suit may be assailed the same as any
other judgment where property interests are directly affected, and may be
vacated after the death of the parties.
In England, sentences of divorce could not at first be re-examined after
death of one of the parties, Robertson v. Stollage, Cro. & Jac. 186, but the
rule now is that it can be opened when fraud is charged. Harrison v. South-
ampton, 21 Eng. L. Eq. 343. Early American cases recognized the right,
but were doubtful as to procedure, Wren v. Moses, 7 Ill. 72, but the authori-
ties are practically unanimous now, that, in the absence of statutory qualifi-
cations, a decree of divorce may be vacated after death of parties, Fidelity
Ins. Co.'s Appeal, 93 Pa. St. 242, Adams v. Adams, 5I N. H. 388, when
obtained by fraud, Brown v. Grove, II6 Md. 84; but not for mere gratifi-
cation of personal feeling, Nichols v. Nichols, 25 N. J. Eq. 6o, or for purely
sentimental reasons, Lawrence v. Nelson, 113 Iowa 277; but there must be
property rights involved, Johnson v. Coleman, 23 Wis. 452, Bousta v. John-
son, 38 Minn. 230. Tennessee, Colorado and Washington seem to be the only
exceptions. Tennessee Statute provides that the only method of reviewing
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a decree of divorce shall be by appeal and time had expired in this case.
Ownes v. Sims, 3 Caldwell (Tenn.) 544. In the California case the decree of
divorce was silent as to property rights. Kirschmer v. Dietrich, n1o Cal. 502.
The Washington case is really the only one directly in conflict, court holding
that parties affected had other avenues for determination of such property
rights as were affected. Nolan v. Duryea, I L. R. A. (Wash.) N. S. 551.
EMINENT DOMAIN-ESTABLISHMENT OF STREET GRADE-SALLDEN V. CITY
OF LITTL FALLS, 113 N. W. (MINN.) 884. Under amendments of state con-
stitution providing that private property shall not be taken or "damaged" for
public use without just compensation, held, that a property owner in a
municipal corporation is entitled to compensation for injuries occasioned
to his property by reason of the first establishment of a street grade.
At Common Law a municipality is not liable to property holders for
consequential damages from grading, unless the property is actually invaded
or the work of improvement negligently done. Radcliffe Exrs. v. Mayor,
etc., of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. I95. Smith v. Washington, 20 How. 135. A
municipality is liable where grade is once established and a subsequent change
is made with damage. City v. Herman, 72 Miss. 211. However, there is a
difference of opinion as to whether there is liability for damages resulting
from the first establishment of a grade. The better opinion holds that there
is. Hendrick's Appeal, lO3 Pa. 358. Eachus v. Los Angeles Consol. R. Co.,
1O3 Cal. 614. The recent case of Manning v. City of Shreveport, 44 So. 882,
discusses the question and adheres to this opinion. A contrary decision was
given in the case of Leiper v. Denver (Colo.), 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1O8, where
Judge Dillon is cited as holding the same doctrine. (See Dillon's Municipal
Corporations, 4th Ed., Vol. 2, Sec. 995b.)
EQuITY-LACHEs--EsSENTIALS OF BAR.-DoNcOuRT v. DENTON, 105 N. Y.
Supp. 9o6.-Held, that while equity does not favor state claims, it will not
condemn a claim because of laches in enforcing it, where defendant has vol-
untarily conceded its existence.
The matter of laches is left to the sound discretion of the chancellor in
each case, Chapman v. Bank of Cal., 97 Cal. i59; nothing can call forth a
Court of Equity into activity but conscience, good faith and reasonable dili-
gence. Golden v. Kimmel, 99 U:'S. 2oi; Price's Appeal, 54 Pa. 472. Courts
of Equity act not so much in analogy to, as in obedience to, statutes of lim-
itation of legal actions, because, when the legal remedy is barred, the spirit
of the statute bars the equitable remedy also. Calhoun v. Millard, 121 N. Y.
69. Some courts have held that even when the Statute of Limitations has
run that laches cannot be brought in as bar, Ruckman v. Cory, 129 U. S. 387;
Hovey v. Bradbury, 112 Cal. 62o; others, that although a party may bring his
suit within the period prescribed by the Statute of Limitations, he may yet
be guilty of such laches as will debar his right to relief in strictly equity
cases, Wolf v. Great Falls W. P. P. T. Co., 15 Mow. 49; Delavan v. Duncan,
49 N. Y. 488; but continued acknowledgment by defendant of plaintiff's right
is generally sufficient to account for delay by plaintiff in instituting suit to
enforce it. Higgins v. Lansingle, 154 Ill. 3o; Robertson v. DuBose, 76 Tex. I.
EQUITY-TRADE MARK AND TRADE NAME-FRAuDULENT REPRESENTA-
TIONS.-MEMPHIS KEELEY INSTITUTE V. LESLIE E. KEELEY Co., 155 FED. 964.-
Plaintiff brings a bill in equity against defendant, falsely claiming to use
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gold in his cure, and making such representations on his labels. Held, that
where plaintiff falsely represents his goods on his labels, he cannot maintain
a suit in equity to protect his business of selling such remedy from invasion
and injury by another.
He who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Bispham on
Equity, Section 42; Milhous V. Sally, 43 S. C. 324; McMullen V. Hoffman, 174
U. S. 654. There is under this doctrine a distinction between enforcing an
illegal contract and getting an accounting of money in the hands of a partner
as the result of such a transaction. Brooks v. Martin, 2 Wall. 7o; Hardy v.
Jones, 63 Kan. 8. Courts of Equity will not interfere by injunction where
there is any lack of truth in plaintiff's case, i. e., where there is any misrepre-
sentation in his trade mark or label. Browne on Trade Marks, Section 474,
et seq.; Siegart v. Abbot, 61 Md. 276; Clotworthy v. Shepp, 42 Fed. 62; Jos-
ephs v. Macowsky, 96 Cal. 518; Koeler v. Sanders, 122 N. Y. 65. Nor will
Chancery interfere by injunction at the suits of the vendor of one quack
patent medicine against another, such controversies having too little merit
to be commended on either side. Heath v. Wright, Fed. Cas. No. 6310. If
the plaintiff has been guilty of unconscientious, inequitable or immoral con-
duct in or about the same matter, whereof he complains of his adversary,
or if his claim to relief grows out of or depends upon, or is inseparably
connected with his own wrong, he will be repelled at the threshold of the
court. Simmons Medicine Co. v. Mansfield Drug Co., 73 Tenn. 84.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE-POLICE POWER-MUNICIPAL REGULATION.-INTER-
NATIONAL TExT-BOOK V. INHABITANTS OF CITY OF AUBURN.-A city ordinance
provided that "no person shall distribute in any public street or from any
buildings, handbills, cards, circulars or papers of any sort, except news-
papers."--Held, that such an ordinance is a lawful police regulation, to pro-
tect people on the street from annoyance, and not unlawful as an interfer-
ence with interstate commerce as against a concern doing business in another
state, and desiring to distribute on the public street circulars advertising
such business.
No state has the power to impose a tax upon the occupation or business
of any person or company engaged in carrying on interstate commerce.
Cdse of State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232; Osborne v. Florida, 33 Fla. 162;
Coin. v. Smith, 92 Ky. 38; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 92 Ky. 38. A power exer-
cised in good faith for public order and comfort will be recognized by U. S.,
although it may bear on the agencies of commerce. Freund on Police Power,
Section 159. The power of the state to protect the lives, health and prop-
erty of its citizens, and to preserve good order and public morals is a power
originally and always belonging to the states, and not surrendered by them
to the general government. Cooley on Const. Law, 3rd Ed., p. 79; U. S.
v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. I, ii. The states have full power to regulate
within their limits matters of internal police. Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 1o7
U. S. 693.
JUDGMENTs-DIsmiSSAL WITHOUT PREJUDIcE-AcTIoNS AT LAW AND IN
EQUITY.-SMITH ET AL. V. COWELL, ET AL., 92 PAC. 2o.-Held, that a decree
of dismissal without prejudice to any "action at law" rendered by a Federal
Court or sustaining a demurrer to the complaint in equity on the grounds
that the plaintiff was not entitled to the equitable relief prayed for, is a bar
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to a subsequent suit in a state court setting up a like equitable cause of action,
the quoted words meaning a cause of action at law, notwithstanding the
Code abolishes the different forms of action.
In most of the states the distinction between the different forms of
action is abolished by statute, and either equitable or legal relief may be
sought and obtainedi and the rules of either law or equity, or both, enforced
in the same court. Hulbutt v. Spalding Saw Co., 93 Cal. 55. But the essen-
tial principles of equitable actions and relief, as distinguished from legal
actions and remedies, are as clearly marked and defined as before the enact-
ment of such statutes. Lackland v. Garesche, 56 Mo. 267. And although
there is only one form of action, the character of the action is determinable
from the pleadings. Lerdersdorf v. Flint, 5o Wis. 401. It is true that an
action brought in a state court in the first instance will not be dismissed
if the facts set up in the complaint entitled the plaintiff to any relief at all,
merely because he has mistaken his remedy or asked for the wrong relief.
White v. Lyons, 42 Cal. 279. Still, if a Federal Court has jurisdiction of
the cause, full faith and credit must be given to its decision, and the plaintiff
can no more invoke again the equitable jurisdiction of, and demand equitable
relief in a state court, than he can in a United States court. Knowlton v.
Hanbury, 117 Ill. 471. And although a decree of dismissal from equity
"without prejudice to an action at law" would leave the parties free to
seek their legal remedy, Cramer v. Moore, 36 Ohio St. 347; it would be as
effective a bar to a subsequent action setting up a like equitable cause of
action as if the quoted words were omitted. Strang v. Moog, 72 Ala. 460o.
MANDAmus-WHEN GRANTED-HUGHES V. NORTH CLINTON BAPTIST
CHURCH Or EAST ORANGE, 67 ATL. 66 (N. J.).-Held, that mandamus is a
proper remedy to secure the reinstatement of one who has been unlawfully
deposed from membership in a church without cause, without charges, and
without opportunity for hearing.
The New Jersey courts alone seem to have held this point; the courts
of the other states have refused mandamus on grounds that mandamus will
not lie to restore to membership in a church when no temporal rights are
involved. Hundley v. Collins, 131 Ala. 234; People v. Ger. A. Ev. Ch., 53
N. Y. 1O3. The rights of a person who has been expelled from a religious
society are to be determined by the constitution of the society, Grosvenor v.
Un. Soc. of Believers, 118 Mass. 78; Merster v. Ansher Chised Congrega-
tion, 37 Mich. 542; an expulsion by the church is not a corporate act and
does not affect any property interest or other valuable civil right of the
expelled member. Sales v. Baptist Church, 62 Iowa 26; Soares v. Hebrew
Congregation, 31 La. Ann. 2o5. In cases of voluntary incorporated societies
the courts will grant mandamus to settle controversies when the facts are
important on public grounds, but first of all there must be a penal decision
by the proper authorities in the society. Lamphere v. United Workmen, 47
Mich. 429; McNeill v. Bibb St. Church, 84 Ala. 23.
PARTITION-DECREE-CoNcLuSIVENESS.-SCHULER v. MURPHY, 44 So.
(MIss.) 8Io.-Held, where in partition no issue was raised between defend-
ants as to the interest of one previously conveyed to the others, and a pro
confesso was taken against all of them, the decrees do not preclude defend-
ants, to whom their co-defendant's interest was conveyed, from asserting
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their title to the proceeds of that interest as against him or his garnishing
creditor.
Partition was at first considered a mere possessory action which left the
title as it found it. Pierce v. Oliver, 13 Mass. 211; Gourdie v. Northampton
Water Co., 7 Pa. St. 238, and would not bar maintenance of writ of right
between same parties. Waller v. Foxcroft, i Story's C. C. 475, but in most
of the states it has come to involve the right as well as possession. Whitte-
more v. Shaw, 8 N. H-. 397, and a decree is binding as to all the rights which
the parties had in the premises at the time of partition, Shaw v. Prettyman,
I Houston (Del.) 334; Christy v. Spring Valley Water Works, 68 Cal. 73,
based on the theory of estoppel, Kane v. The Rock River Canal Co., 15 Wis.
205; but this does not follow unless questions of title were put in issue.
Finley v. Cathcart, 149 Md. 470. One exception seems to be Missouri, where
judgment of partition is conclusive as to the title of the land which is the
subject of the suit, Ferder v. Davis, 38 MO. 115; but this is based on statu-
tory requirements, compelling all titles to be set forth and requiring the court
to declare interests of defendants as well as petitioners.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-RATIFICATION-PREJUDIcE.-NORDEN V. DkUKE,
104 N. Y. SupP. 854.-Held, that where the unauthorized contract made by
an agent in the name of his principal had been fully executed before the
principal learned of the transaction, his failure to notify the parties who con-
tracted with his agent that the transaction was unauthorized, did not ren-
der him liable, upon the theory of ratification, since they had not been preju-
diced by his silence.
Where the act of the agent is unauthorized, the principal must acquiesce
to be bound, Ward v. Williams, 26 Ill. 447; in order to raise the inference
of acquiescence from silence of the alleged principal, it is necessary that he
should be fully informed of the unauthorized transaction. Un. G. M. Cr. v.
Rocky Mt. Nat. Bank, 2 Col. 565. On the subject, when silence will con-
stitute a ratification, the courts are divided; some hold that the mere silence
of a principal may, under some circumstances, be deemed a ratification of
the acts of a pretended agent, yet a mere failure to disavow such acts
instantly upon being approved of them, will not, ipso facto, be a ratification,
Swartwout v. Evans, 37 Ill. 442; Miller v. Excelsior Stone Co., I Ill. App.
273; but, others hold, that repudiation must be at once on receiving knowl-
edge. Kchlor, Updike & Co. v. Kemble, 26 La. Ann. 713; Bredin v. Dubarry,
14 Serg. P. R. 27 (Pa.). A few courts have held that where the agent
exceeds his authority, the principal to avoid the act is not obliged to give
notice by repudiation, Powell's Adm'r v. Henry, 27 Ala. 612; but the better
opinion is, that the principal must repudiate the unauthorized acts of his
agent within a reasonable time after he has knowledge of them, or he will
become bound. Abbe & Colt v. Rood & Rood, 6 McLean 1o6.
RAILROADs-AccIDENTs-DUTY To LoOK AND LISTEN.-ELGIx, J. & E. Ry.
Co. v. LAwLOR, 82 N. E. (ILL.) 4o7.-Held, that the failure of one driving
across railroad tracks to look and listen is not negligence as a matter of law,
as there may be circumstances excusing such failure.
A person about to cross a railroad traqk, to be free from negligence,
must take such precautions as could be reasonably expected of an ordinarily
prudent man, under like circumstances. Chicago, etc., Co. v. Hedges, Admr.,
io5 Ind. 398. The failure of a person approaching a railroad track to look
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and listen for an approaching train does not necessarily, or as a matter of
law, constitute negligence. This is the general rule. Topeka, etc., Co. v.
Cline, i35 Ill. 41; Eilert v. Green Bay, etc., Co., 48 Wis. 606; Davis v. N. Y.,
etc., Co., 47 N. Y. 400. Quite a number of the states, however, hold that
a failure to look and listen is negligence, per se. Denver, etc., Co. v.
Ryan, 17 Colo. 98; Phila., etc., Co. v. Hogeland, 66 Md. 149; Smith v. P. &
R. Ry. Co., i6o Pa. St. II7; McBride v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., ig Ore.
64; The C. H. & L Ry. Co. v. Duncan, Admr., 143 Ind. 524; Ga. Pac. Ry.
Co. v. Lee, 92 Ala. 262; Johnson v. Chicago, etc., Co., 91 Io. 248. One
Pennsylvania case went so far as to hold that, where a traveler approach-
ing the tracks with a team, if unable to see them, he must get out and lead his
team across. Pa. Ry. Co. v. Beale, 73 Pa. St. 509. Even in those states
which consider a failure to stop, look and listen, contributory negligence,
there are a number of things which excuse such failure. For example:
where the party is thrown off his guard by some act of the company. Grand
Rapids, etc., Co. v. Cox, 8 Ind. App. 29. When smoke and dust would pre-
vent a view. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Hansen, I66 II1. 623.
Where snow, gale and wind prevent seeing. Atchison, etc., Co. v. Morgan,
43 Kan. I. If fences and buildings are in the way of sight. Randall v.
Conn. River Ry. Co., 132 Mass. 269. In case a gateman is stationed at the
track to warn people, in such case it is not contributory negligence to
approach track with a team, and drive over in a trot. Railroad Co. v.
Schneider, 45 Oh. St. 678.
SLANDER-PPVILEGEII COMMUNICATIONS-COMMON INTEREsT.-RosEN-
SAUM v. ROCHE, 101 S. W. 1164 (TEx.).-Held, where an employer is
requested by the father of a discharged employee, who, though of age, is
living with her father as a member of his family, and under his care and
protection, to state the reason why his daughter was discharged, the reply
of the employer would be privileged; but if the employer voluntarily statest
to the father the reason why the discharge was made, the statement would
not be privileged.
When the communication is made in good faith, without malice, in
honest belief of truth, it would be privileged, Fresh v. Cutter, 73 Md. 91,
but it must be shown that the words were spoken at such a time, and under
such circumstances as to negative the supposition of malice, and plaintiff
must prove the existence of malice as the real motive of defendant's lan-
guage. Buler v. Jackson, 64 Mo. 589. When slanderous words are spoken
with malice, they are not privileged. Preston v. Frey, 9i Cal. io7; but if, in
answer to a request of the mother in regard to misconduct of a minor daugh-
ter, it is privileged, Long v. Peters, 47 Ia. 239, or if made voluntarily to one
who has an interest in it, or one that has a reasonable duty to receive such
information, Erber v. Dun, 12 Fed. 526, and if a statement is made in the
discharge of a public or private duty, whether legal or moral, it is also
privileged. Moore v. Butter, 48 N. H. 165.
STREET RAILROADS-AccIDENT-CONTRUTORY NEGLIGENCE-CARE RE-
QUIRED BY THE COMPANY.-HARRIS v. LINCOLN TRACTION Co., III N. W. 580
(NEB.).-Held, that the mere fact that the car was running at a rate of speed
prohibited by the ordinance of the city does not of itself entitle plaintiff to
recover.
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It has been held in a number of states that an injury caused by a street
car running at a greater rate of speed than that prescribed by the ordinance
of the city establishes negligence per se. Kan. City Sub. Belt. Ry. Co. v.
Herman, 62 Pac. 543; Moore v. St. Louis Transit Co., 194 Mo. I. But it
seems, in many courts, that whether the lawful rate of speed be considered
as negligence per se or not, the proximate cause of the accident must have
been the excessive rate of speed. Memphis St. Ry. Co. v. Haynes, 112 Tenn.
712; Bresse v. Los Angeles Traction Co., 85 Pac. 152. Some courts have
said that the mere violation of a city ordinance regulating the rate of speed
within its corporate limits will not render a railroad liable for personal
injury, unless the disobedience was an appreciable agency in producing the
injury. B. & P. Ry. Co. v. Golway, 6 App. Div. D. C. 143; Stahl v. Lake
Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., 117 Mich. 273. And it has even been held that as
it is always a question for the jury to determine, whether a car was travel-
ing at a dangerous rate of speed or not, what was the lawful rate is not
admissible for any purpose. Ford v. Paducah City Ry. Co., 99 S. W. 355
(Ky.). However, in a majority of the states, although it is recognized that
the fact that the car was being driven at an unlawful rate of speed would
not alone give the injured a right of action, yet this fact is admissible and
may be taken into consideration on the question of negligence. Hanlon v.
So. Boston H. Ry. Co., 129 Mass. 31o; Wall v. Helena St. Ry. Co., 12
Mont. 45.
STREET RAILROADS-REGULATION-SEATS FOR PASSENGERS-NoRTH JERSEY
ST. Ry. Co. v. JERSEY CITY, 67 ATL. (N. J.) lO72.-Held, that an ordinance
requiring trolley corporations to run a sufficient number of cars during even-
ing rush hours to provide with a seat every passenger from whom a fare
is demanded and to keep no one waiting more than five minutes, not appear-
ing to be unreasonable as to one terminal and not under all circumstances
unreasonable as to other, will not be set aside in toto.
Public convenience is the main consideration of such a question. Loader
v. Brooklyn Hg'ts R. Co., 35 N. Y. Supp. 996. Though the ownership of such
a company is private, the use is public. Olcott v. The Supervisors, 16 Wall.
695. The reasonableness of an ordinance is to be regarded. Mayor, etc.,
of New York v. N. Y. & H. R. Co., 31 N. Y. Supp. 147. If the power to
legislate is possessed, there is a presumption as to the reasonableness of the
legislation, and, unless clearly shown otherwise, courts will not interfere.
Paxson v. Sweet, I Cr. (N. J.) 196. Loss of profits or incurring great
expense does not control the situation. Mayor, etc., v. D. D., E. B. & B. R.
R. Co., 133 N. Y. 113. If an ordinance is efficacious in one locality, it need
not be an entire nullity. Penna. R. R. Co. v. Jersey City, 18 Vroom. 286.
For cases regulating the running of cars, see Mayor, etc., v. D. D., E. B. &
B. R. R. Co., ut supra; City of N. Y. v. N. Y. & H. R. Co., supra.
TAXATION-MUNICIPAL PROPERTY-ELECTRIc LIGHT PLANT.-COM. V.
CITY OF PADUCAH, 102 S. W. 882 (KEN.).-Held, a city's electric light plant
is not liable for state and county taxes. O'Rear, C. J., and Nunn and Car-
roll, J.J., dissenting.
The law in regard to electric light plants is analogous to that of city water
and gas works, upon which the courts are not agreed. Whatever property is
necessary to the administration of the city is exempt, but where it is used
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by city for its own profit, it is not exempt, City of Louisville v. Corn., 62
Ky. 295, and it must be used for public purposes, Newark v. Township of
Clinton, 49 N. J. L. 37o. Waterworks and gasworks are property for public
purposes, Dillon Mun. Corps., 3rd Ed., Sec. 5oS;. while in Board of Trustees v.
Atlanta, 113 Ga. 883, public property was said to embrace only such property
as is owned by the state and title to which is vested directly in it. Tangible
property used for waterworks is subject to taxation, and must be treated as
property of a private corporation, City of Newport v. Corn., io6 Ky. 434, as
contracts for furnishing gas to inhabitants are not made by virtue of its power
of local sovereignty, but in the capacity of a private corporation. Western
Saving Fund Society v. City of Phila., 31 Pa. St. 175. The majority of cases
seem to consider it exempt, saying that the business of conducting a water-
works is a business of public nature, Rochester v. Rush, 8o N. Y. 302, being
matters within the scope of functions that are attributed to governments, State
v. Toledo, 48 Ohio St. 112, and buildings and other property owned by munici-
pal corporations and appropriated to public uses are exempt. Camden v.
Village Corporations, 77 Me. 530. Municipal corporations running water-
works for public purposes exclusively are exempt, but not if run for pecuni-
ary gain, City of Nashville v. Smith, 86 Tenn. 213, but the fact that the city
charged residents within its corporate limits for water furnished, and
thereby realized a considerable revenue, does not defeat the implied
exemption from taxation, Smith v. Nashville, 88 Tenn. 464; Summer County
v. Wallington, 66 Kan. 590; Town of West Hartford v. Board of Water Corns.,
44 Conn. 360, as the imposition of water rents is only a mode of taxation for
raising revenue to carry on the work of government. Springfield H. & M.
Ins. Co. v. Keeseville, 148 N. Y. 467.
THEATER TIexrs-REFUSAL OF ADMISSION-DAMAGES.-PEOPLE EX REL.
BURNHAM V. FLYNN, 82 N. E. i69.-Held, that the holder of a ticket of
admission to a place of amusement is, on being refused admission, entitled
to recover the amount paid therefor and the necessary expenses incurred to
attend.
The courts of this country generally hold that a ticket of admission to a
public performance is merely a revocable license to witness the performance,
the revocation of which entitles the holder to damages as for the breach of
a simple contract. Burton v. Scherf, i Allen 133; Collister v. Haymen, 183
N. Y. 25o. In some of the earlier cases it has been said that the action is
analogous to that of a passenger for the illegal removal from a passenger
train, in which case damage for the injury to the plaintiff's feelings and his
wounded pride is allowed. Smith v. Leo, 92 Hun. 242. But the duties and
obligations of common carriers, as distinguished from theater managers, are
clearly marked and defined and their liability rests on different grounds.
Horney v. Nixon, 213 Pa. 2o. And although a revocation without just cause,
accompanied by a rude ejection, will give rise to an action ex delicto, Joseph
v. Bidwell, 28 La. Ann. 382; Drew v. Peer, 93 Pa. 234; and punitive damages
may be allowed to be recovered where the statutes of the state make it
unlawful to refuse admission to anyone presenting a ticket, Greenberg v.
Western Turf Ass'n, I4o Cal. 357, the rule generally recognized is that if, in
revoking the license, the defendant violated his contract, he is liable for any




WATERs-GREAT PONDS-POWERS OF STATE.-AmERICAN WOOLEN Co. V.
KENNEBEC WATER DisT., 66 ATL. 316 (ME.).-Held, that lakes and ponds of
more than ten acres in extent are known as "great ponds" and are under the
ownership and control of the state for the benefit of the public. The state
can, at its discretion, authorize the diversion of their waters for public pur-
poses, without providing compensation to riparian owners upon the ponds or
their outlets.
Maine and Massachusetts are the only states which hold that ponds of
ten acres and over are public property; this came from the Colonial Ordi-
nance of 1641-1647. Mansur v. Blake, 62 Me. 38; Hittinger v. Eames, 121
Mass. 539. In the other states, only the great inland lakes which are naviga-
ble, and highways of inland communication and trade are public property,
while in the small, unnavigable ponds, the riparian bound is the center.
Fletcher v. Phelps, 28 Vt 257; Edwards v. Ogle, 76 Ind. 302. These courts
hold that the state, as proprietor, has no greater right than any other pro-
prietor would have, as against the owners upon the streams from ponds, on
the grounds that a permanent deprivation means the loss of a constitutional
right, i. e., the protection of property, Cowles v. Kidder, 24 N. H. 364; that
damages must be given for injuries sustained because of another exercising
his rights under a statute, G. R. Booming Co. v. Jarvis, 3o Mich. 308; that no
riparian proprietor has a right to use the waters of a stream to the prejudice
of other proprietors above or below, Clinton v. Myers, 46 N. Y. 5I1; that the
legislature cannot authorize the infliction of such an injury without making
provisions for compensation. Eaton v. B. C. P. M. R. R., 51 N. H. 504.
WiLLS-CoNsTRUCTION-PARoL EVIDENcE.-PEET v. PEET, 82 N. E.(ILL.)
376.-Testator made a will leaving all his property to his wife, making no
references to his children. Eighteen months thereafter a child was born.
A state statute provided that a child born to any testator after the making
of his will shall not be disinherited unless it shall appear from the will that
it was the intention of the testator to disinherit such child. Held, that parol
evidence was admissible to enable the court to see and determine that such
was the testator's intention. Cartwright, Farmer, and Dunn, J.J., dissenting,
A will is at common law revoked by subsequent marriage and birth of
issue. , Redtield on Wills, Ch. VII. Neither one alone is enough to revoke
a will. Brush v. Wilkins, 4 Johns. Ch. 5o6. Birth of a child alone will effect
a revocation of a will. McCullum v. McKenzie, 26 Ia. 51o. Parol evidence
of testator's intention is admissible to explain latent ambiguities. i Tarman
on Wills, Section 402, et seq.; Trustees v. Peasely, 15 N. H. 317. That ted-
tator did not intend the person to have any part of the estate must be ascer-
tained from the proper meaning of the words of the will and not from
extrinsic testimony. Chenault's Guardian v. Chenailt's Exec., 88 Ky. 83.
Extrinsic testimony is admissible of circumstances relating to the testator,
individually, and his affairs, to enable the court to discover the meaning
attached by the testator to the words used in the will, and apply them to the
particular facts in the case. Peet v. Railway, 70 Tex. 522. Under statute
similar to one in this case, extrinsic testimony showing an intention to dis-
inherit child was held admissible. Willson v. Fosket, 6 Metc. 44o; Lorieux
v. Keller, 51O, 196; Coulan v. Doull, Estate of Garraud, 35 Cal. 336; Hill
v. Hill, 4 Utah 267. Contra, 7 Wash. 409.
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WITNESSES-PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS TO PHYSICIANS-WAIVFR..-
Nomix v. HOQUiAm LuMBER AND SHINGLE Co., 92 PAC. (WASH.) 372.-
Plaintiff in an action for personal injuries testified as to the character and
extent of his injuries. Held, that he did not thereby waive the privilege
granted him by statute, which enjoins secrecy upon attending physicians,
unless they have the consent of their patients to be examined. Hadley, C. J.,
and Root, J., dissenting.
These statutes commonly provide that physicians cannot testify to the
result of examinations and observations made by them upon the person of a
patient, unless the patient consents, or in some way waives his privilege.
Williams v. Johnson, 112 Ind. 273; Davis v. Supreme Lodge, 165 N. Y. 159.
He may do so by calling physician to testify in his behalf, or by a clause in a
contract. Adreveno v. Mutual, etc., Assn., 34 Fed. 870. But he need not,
when he calls his physician to testify, specifically state his intention to make
such waiver. Holcomb v. Harris, 166 N. Y. 257. Where a patient goes on
the stand and testifies to what the physician said and found, he thereby
waives his privilege under the statute and the physician may testify. Highfill
v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 93 Mo. App. 219. But where she has testified as to her
general health, that does not permit her physician to be called in order to
contradict her, wherein he relates confidential communications made by her
to him. McConnell v. City of Osage, 8o Ia. 293. A client does not consent
that attorney shall testify to privileged communication made by him, by him-
self testifying to the action generally, but he does if he discloses the confi-
dential communication. Oliver v. Pate, 43 Ind. 132. Patient by calling on
his physician to testify does not thereby waive his right to object to other
physicians who have treated him, testifying on the same subject. Mellor v.
Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., IO5 Mo. 455; Baxter v. Grand Rapids, 1O3 Ia. 599. The
rule of evidence which excludes the communication between physician and
patient must be evoked by an objection at the time the evidence of the wit-
ness is given. Lissar v. Crocker Estate Co., 119 Cal. 442; Hoyt v. Hoyt, 112
N. Y. 514. Under a statute practically the same as the one in this case a
physician who attended a party was not allowed to testify to her condition
and symptoms, as disclosed by his examination and observation, even though
she had testified in her own behalf in respect thereto. Green v. Nebagamani,
113 Wis. 5o8.
